Abstract: This study examines how digital financial reporting affects accounting conservatism. Traditional theories of conservatism posit that information asymmetry increases the demand for conservative reporting and that improvements in transparency should therefore reduce conservatism. In contrast, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) characterizes conservatism as a “sticky” practice that may persist despite improvements in the information environment. Whether enhanced corporate transparency reduces or amplifies conservatism remains an empirical question. I investigate this question using the Securities and Exchange Commission’s mandate for eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL), which began in 2011. XBRL introduces a machine-readable reporting format that substantially lowers information-processing costs and improves users’ ability to access and analyze financial disclosures. Contrary to the substitution view, I find that firms subject to the XBRL mandate exhibit higher conditional conservatism than comparable non-XBRL firm-years. Moreover, within the population of XBRL filers, firms that report more XBRL tags exhibit greater conditional conservatism. These results are robust to alternative measures, specifications, and identification strategies. The effects are concentrated among firms with relatively opaque information environments, consistent with a verification mechanism whereby digital transparency enhances users’ ability to detect previously undisclosed risks and increases pressure on managers to recognize economic losses in a timely manner.
Keywords: Digital Financial Reporting, Accounting Standards, XBRL, Information Transparency, Information Processing Costs, Conditional Conservatism, Conservatism, Asymmetric Timeliness, Monitoring, Governance, Contracting.